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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(i) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a 
criminal case may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a 
conviction and final judgment involving a conviction of a first 
degree felony. 
IV 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the admission into evidence and publication of 
Mr, Albretson's mug shot deny him a fair trial? 
2. Did the failure to grant defense counsel's objection 
to surprise alibi rebuttal testimony deny Mr. Albretson due process? 
v 
TEXTS OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL I\-A. 
Rule -~° 3 ^^ *-^** n'.; 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, 
considerations of undue delay, waste on ti in e , c • ] : 
needless presentation of ci imi i] ative evidence. 
Rule . < .«•- • - Rules ot Evidence ii^o-; provides: 
Cnaracte. evi-j^ nc*- nc ^ LP ssibi- \ • :^)ve 
conduct; exceptions; ?ti •- "rimes. 
'a' Character evidence generan^, 
OL ^ pei'.-Ajp.': character or a trait of his 
character is not aimissibb f ?r "he purpose o? 
proving that he acted in confer:;ty therew:--
particular occasion, except: 
v 4. / Character of a^ -?..;ed. Evidence of 
a pertinent trait of n s character offered v" 
an accused, •~,r Vs" • -^  ^^-'^nH.v i - ^bu u 
the same; 
;naracter of victim. Evidence; ,;. a 
pertinent trait of character of the vi:tLp 
the crime offered by an accused, or by t;> 
prosecution to rebu- -he sa:ne, -.- evidence 
a character trait of peacefulness of tne 
victim offered by the prosecution in a 
homicide case to rebut evidence tha*: t ^  
victim wa.^  the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. vidence of 
th^ character OL a wL".:ie *?. as provider 
Rules 60", 608, and 609. 
'
l
 Other crimes, wrongs ,.. a^ , . -,-dence 
o: -rimes, wrongs or acts is no- admitsinle 
to pcov^ ^ :>- character af a person in order to 
show that he acted in conformity therewith. it 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of .-jtwe, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, know Led^ id^nti*-- ^ -^ ^  ^ *e 
of mist-ake o- accident. 
Utah Code " r " -"• < n n o c o is amende, * provider: 
Alii '*-i-'.e Lc^uLLeiaents- -Witness lists. 
• defendant, whether or not written 
, ^as been made, who intends to offer 
evidence of an alibi -hall, not less than ten days 
before trial or ac such other time as the court 
may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting 
attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to 
claim alibi. The not ice sha11 contain spec if ic 
information as to the place where the defendant 
claims to have been at the time of the alleged 
offense and, as particularly as is known to the 
defendant or his attorney, the nam.es and addresses 
of the witnesses by whom he proposes to establish 
alibi. The prosecuting attorney, not more than 
five days after receipt of the list provided 
herein or at such other time as the court may 
direct, shall file and serve the defendant with 
the addresses, as particularly as are known to 
him, of the witnesses the state proposes to offer 
to contradi ct or i mpeach 11 1 e defendantf s alibi 
evidence. 
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney 
shall be under a continuing duty to disclose the 
names and addresses of additional witnesses which 
come to the a11ention of either party af ter f i Iing 
their alibi witness lists. 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney 
fails to comply with the requirements of this 
section, the court may exclude evidence offered to 
establish or rebut alibi. However, the defendant 
may always testify on his own behalf concerning 
a 1 i b i 
( 4 ) «p h
 e court HI a y , £ o r g o o d c a use s 1 i o w n , 
waive the requirements of this section. 
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fne i • r .• ,v, - v ' o n -r hone 
* * * ^  '" "" "
 :n^id'- - ^  n.vi^^ P->*- d few minutes, she 
,. i i I i ' h o n 
^ she approached L':IH end ^f ' %,e na.iwav, a -v-tn .* 
u
 V 3 suddenly stepper xn ^ ^ I L „f ne: :r„ : _eiind 
d cor a c: 
The man was approximately two feet away from Ms. Leavitt, 
and she saw him for approximately three seconds before she was hit 
in the head and left unconscious (T. 21, 24, 50). 
Ms. Leavitt was subsequently hospitalized for her 
injuries. After her release, and three days after the incident, 
Detective Hutchison left a book of pictures with Ms. Leavitt's 
husband in hopes that Ms. Leavitt could identify her assailant among 
the pictures (T. 38). Ms. Leavitt looked through the book 
containing thirty to fifty photos, then stated to her husband, 
n[t]his looks like the man that beat me" (T. 38-9). The photo 
Ms. Leavitt selected was that of the defendant, Douglas Albretson 
(T. 54). 
That night, Ms. Leavitt also told Detective Hutchison 
that the photo looked like the assailant. The next day, Detective 
Hutchison showed Ms. Leavitt a piece of cardboard with six pictures 
attached. Ms. Leavitt again selected the photograph of 
Mr. Albretson (T. 39-40, 55). 
On July 22, 1987, Mr. Albretson filed a Notice of Intent 
to Rely on the Defense of Alibi as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§77-14-2(1) (1953 as amended). The defendant listed Brenda Davis 
and Cindy Edwards as alibi witnesses (R. 22). (Addendum A). On 
July 27, 1987, defendant filed an amended notice which contained a 
change of address for Brenda Davis (R. 24). (Addendum B). The 
State filed its Reply to Notice of Alibi on July 30, 1987. In its 
reply notice, the State listed Officer Brandt Hutchison of the Salt 
- 2 -
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 C o u r u h e a r ^  '1 ^  f Q p d ay" *' ! **1 * * i *, i ^  ; i — ~ -j -* * d e 
e/i-Jnace o;: .. .ior c o m i :• . 
sustained defense coun.^-' ' ; obje^tior - x: ; - • -. s-~ iooseleaf 
jiriu utier^d the aiceration of Sxhicit J-3 
(*::.e s u - p i ^ t xt^ ^i, ,;.. spread Id . 
M tria r°;", H x a n m - r i ' •. • "• - prosecutor showed 
.•".^'-dU. »-*•• ^ c 1 - 1 f i p d ^ - a ~ 
D e t e c t i v e * iiu; oniooii b o u g h t \,ha*
 t/.oi. • s p r e a : • . . ; 
t a n r n H u p i v ^ l ^ o t P d " • I'ore^.* in's p n c . o g r a p - . "r ^  ~ h e p h o t o o o o k 
( .;'-"' \ a c « d n 'A o_y c n e 
p h o t o g r a p n -r-.-c-i s:ie s e i e c c e o a^ h ^ r J S O . I L . L U M - .. D e t e c t i v e 
H M * - ^ h i ^ ^ n - *• - ^n n^' 7^ - i >v a Irn i ^  tin of \ * e s i x - p i c t u r e ph<::o s p r e a d 
a D e f e r i s * :: :) i 11 1 s < * ] s t a t e i t: h a t she 
na. 'rv oh H- ••-ion to r- s admissi m " but asked that it i lot be 
p — ' • • - ^ i 
£- o 'v *" >o c^  o n *- •  
pi;=- jjr : 
"-^ '
 r o ^ r t admitted the exhibit but did not 
ross-exaMin i i^n, 'hp following exchange, which 
*"« cross-examination d i a 1 o g u e concerning t h e 
0. You chose a photograph that resembled the 
person you remembered seeing at that poi nt; i s 
tnat correct? 
Yes . 
Then yuu Lu±w J- ... auuchxs^. 
you felt looked like the person? 
Yes T - * 1 ^ ' - : ' " "". [ 
Q. A day or two later Det. Hutchison brought you 
the exhibit that I believe is State's No. 8, the 
photograph exhibit; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you picked one out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Albretson's picture was in that document, 
wasn't it? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. And you recognized it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was a picture of the same personf Doug 
Albretsen, a picture of (sic)? 
• • . . * 
Q. When you first saw the first photograph in 
the book of photographs that Det. Hutchison left 
for you to look at, what is it you said to your 
husband? 
A. I said, "This looks like the man that beat 
me." 
Q. All right. Nothing further. 
(T. 54-6). 
On direct examination, the prosecutor questioned 
Ms. Leavitt regarding the differences between the first and second 
photograph of the man she had identified as her assailant, which 
photograph appeared to be the more recent, and her reasons for 
picking the second photograph (T. 56-7). On re-cross-examination, 
defense counsel directed three questions to Ms. Leavitt, asking if 
she could discern whether the first and second photographs were of 
the same man (T. 58). 
Following the testimony of another witness, the 
prosecutor asked outside the presence of the jury that the two 
photographs Ms. Leavitt selected as her assailant be shown to the 
jury. The prosecutor told the Court that the numbers and words 
"Salt Lake County" which were on the photograph taken from the book 
- 4 
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Defense course L oo je^.ed because -'u was apparent that 
e;i ljnce ;>f . p: .• r^ a-"resr. -•' ; . r.\^  Court ov-rruie^ 
cion ar ~ " ] ^ v;'~j * " • - * - o i •-h i *• - ° ' f r * ^  * - ^  r ^ f i • - ~ *  • "> " : e 
. La : m u g s \ , , <»;•_ 
( T . ; 0 - ] ) . i ! g a i i o / e i: d e f e n s e o b j e c t i o n , t h e C o u r t a 11 o w e d E x h i b i t s 
S - 9 l • :i S ] 0 i : b < : i p i i b ] i s h e d t o t: h e j i l r ] r ( T / I ) . 
B a s e d u p o n f: I: I e a d m I s s I o n a n d p i i b 1 i c a 11 o n o f 11 i e 
photographs taken from the black mug sho* boo^ , defense counsel made 
7 9 80 ) r! < " •:: r t d e n i e d t h e m ot i o n 
( r . » l i . 
As oar i if i--: ^ a ^ e i ^h i -\ , " ;>- *-fense c a l l e d 
State rxn^ K "..*: :^r ^ n i i - i io'.ic- , • - . T ,«J '^-- / •• '^e 
D e f e n , , , p ^f ' • ^  ',: ") 1 :' - tes!" l Tie : 
t 
s o n , anc xl'oretso:. " .*-- nk i a - I :*• , <r ^ : ,-j '.> <<x:- a n 3 
E m i g r a t i o n "" r^ r 
H u t c h i s o n . J i , \ - * n ^ a c e m e n : . : r JV: '•* • . Da 7 is ' 'ia: S:J~ « O U _ : e s t i f y 
that she =*n ; *i *- . ^"-^r^f^on d r n^ 'ip- Parl^v's Way and Emi gration 
C J .. - - ( ) i l c i: o s s e: : a m i r I a, t i o i i < 3 f 
Ms. D a vis, 11 i e prosecuto r extensively questioned Ms . D avis a s t o t h e 
details of the route taken tl irough Parley's Way and Emigration 
Canyon (T. 95-7). 
After the defense rested, the prosecutor informed the 
Court that he intended to present rebuttal testimony but that it 
would take some time to obtain the witness (T. 114). Following a 
short recess, the State had not yet located the witness and 
suggested that the Court take its noon recess, after which time the 
State would present its rebuttal witness (T. 115). 
Defendant made a motion that evidence be closed at that 
time and pointed out that the defense had not been informed of a 
rebuttal witness named Mr. Miller with the Department of 
Transportation and that it was not appropriate for the Court to 
allow the State to "go find a witness who has not been anticipated 
and the defense has not been made aware of in an alibi case. . . ." 
(T. 116). The Court denied the motion and recessed the Court for 
its noon recess at 11:39 a.m. to reconvene at 1:45 p.m. (T. 117, 
119). Defense counsel again objected to the State's preferred 
rebuttal witness in chambers (T. 120-4). 
Following the noon recess, the State presented the 
testimony of Richard Miller, an employee of the Utah Department of 
Transportation. Mr. Miller testified that State Road 65 was closed 
during the time that Ms. Davis testified that she and Mr. Albretson 
drove through Parley's Way and Emigration Canyon (T. 125-129). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting 
and publishing a mug shot of Mr. Albretson to the jury. The mug 
- 6 -
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POINT I 
T H £ T R I A L C Q U R T C Q M M I T T E D p R E J [jpiciAL ERROR IN 
ADMITTING AND PUBLISHING A MUG SHOT OF DEFENDANT, 
Police photographs or mug shots have been around 
for well over a half a century and prosecutors 
have avoided using them as borne out by the fact 
th&t Taylor is the only Mississippi case that we 
can find where they were introduced into 
evidence. This case comes on the heels of 
Taylor. We would point out before the practice 
becomes widespread, that the ilse of mug shots 
except when absolutely necessary, is inviting 
error Sloan v. State, 4 37 S o . 2d ] 6, J 8 r • 1 
(Miss. 1 9 8TT 
A. 
ADMISSION AND PUBLICATION O? 
IN H E R E N T L Y P R h - Jr J ) IC M T•, . 
:- v-j o? cas e s beiinnii^; 
J-) SHOT W A S 
C o u: - as 
establishes or implies other criminal conduct by the defendant. See 
e.g. State v. Pacheco, 712 P„2d 192 (Utah 1985); State v. Saunders, 
699 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 738 (Utah 
1980); and State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979). The Court 
has reached its decisions based on the prohibition in the Rules of 
Evidence against the use of prior bad acts to prove character (see 
Pacheco, 712 P.2d at 1951) as well as the constitutional guarantee 
in both the state and federal constitutions of due process and a 
fair trial for a criminal defendant. (See e.g. McCumber, 722 P.2d 
at 356; Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741-2; State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 
1370 (Utah 1986) . ) 
In Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741, this Court noted the Rules 
of Evidence are designed to protect against undue prejudice which 
would be caused by the jury's knowledge of a defendant's other 
criminal acts. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
In State v.Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 496 (Utah 1988) 
(Zimmerman, J. concurring in the result, joined in part by 
Stewart, A.C.J, and Durham, J.), Justice Zimmerman discussed the 
1
 Pacheco was decided pursuant to Rule 55 of the former 
Rules of Evidence. Rule 55 was the predecessor to Rule 404(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). 
- 8 -
application of Rules 403 and 404 to evidence of other crimes.2 He 
pointed out that n[t]he present Utah Rules of Evidence 
embody . . . [a] long-standing common-law approach to evidence of 
prior crimes or bad character" which disfavors the use of such 
evidence during the guilt phase of a trial, jjd. He further noted: 
[Rule 404(b)] permits introduction of evidence of 
prior crimes or bad acts to prove certain facts 
relevant to pending charges, but only if the 
evidence is admissible under rule 403, i.e., only 
if the danger of unfair prejudice does not 
outweigh the probative value of the evidence, 
[footnote omitted] 
Id. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
In State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah 1984), this Court 
reversed the defendant's conviction under Rule 45, the predecessor 
to Rule 403, because the probative value of evidence of a robbery 
which occurred twenty minutes prior to the incident charged was 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. This Court 
pointed out: 
The merely cumulative character of the robbery evidence 
on the element of knowledge and intent regarding the 
theft charge is significant because it highlights the 
limited value this evidence has when weighed against the 
substantial possibility that a jury would be prejudiced 
2
 In State v. Bell, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 26, 30 (1988), 
in footnote 22, this Court favorably noted this discussion by 
Justice Zimmerman in State v. Bishop. 
- Q 
by evidence of Holderfs commission of another 
crime. 
JA. at 584. 
Article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution 
guarantee due process and a fair trial to a criminal defendant. In 
his concurrence in State v. Bishop, Justice Zimmerman pointed out 
"[1 language in some of our cases, such as State v. Saunders and 
State v, Tarafa, plainly states that permitting the jury to consider 
otherwise inadmissible bad character evidence for the sole purpose 
of determining guilt denies a defendant due process in violation of 
the state and federal constitutions." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 497. 
Mug shot evidence which is merely cumulative does not fit 
within the identity exception of Rule 404(b). The inherently 
prejudicial nature of such evidence has the effect of suggesting to 
the jury that the defendant was involved in prior criminal activity 
and outweighs any minimal probative value. As a result, the 
admission and publication of such evidence violates both Rules 403 
and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) and the defendant's right 
to due process under the state and federal constitutions. 
The issue of whether mug shots are inadmissible in a 
criminal prosecution due to their prejudicial effect has never been 
directly decided by this Court.3 In State v. Owens, 388 P.2d 797 
3
 The paucity of Utah case law dealing with this issue 
despite the fact that mug shots are commonly utilized in criminal 
law enforcement may be indicative of a consensus by trial judges and 
prosecutors that such evidence is inherently prejudicial and 
therefore rarely admitted in a criminal trial. 
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(Utah 1964), the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in 
admitting testimony "concerning the presentation by police to [a 
witness] of 'mug1 shots and [the witness] identification of the 
appellant in one of these pictures." _id. at 797. In Owens, defense 
counsel did not object to the admissibility of the "mug" shots, and 
the Court appeared to rule on the admissibility of the witness1 
prior identification rather than the admissibility of the "mug" 
shots themselves. 
A careful reading of Owens does not show the Court 
condoning the use of mug shots nor determining their admissibility 
under the predecessor to Rule 404(b). The Owens court relied upon 
State v. Aguirre, 158 Cal.App.2d 304, 322 P.2d 478 (Cal. App. 1958) 
which held that a witness who identified a defendant at trial could 
testify as to her prior identification of the defendant at a lineup 
and from photographs. JEd. at 798, fn 1. 
Utah cases citing Owens do not refer to it in regard to 
the admission of "mug" shot photographs; instead, cases which cite 
Owens rely on its holding that evidence of prior identification is 
admissible. See e.g., State v. Jiron, 492 P.2d 983 (Utah 1972). 
In State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982), the 
defendant claimed that he was denied a fair trial where the trial 
court admitted "mug" shots as evidence. This Court noted that 
"McCardell's arguments on this point clearly have merit" (J^ d. at 
946) but did not address the issue due to counsel's failure to make 
a specific objection. 
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In the present case, the prosecutor attempted to 
introduce and publish the "mug" shot book and "mug" shot of 
Mr. Albretson on the grounds that the evidence was necessary to 
demonstrate the difference between Mr. Albretson's in-person 
appearance with that of the "mug" shot (T. 68-70). However, an 
argument that Mr. Albretson's mug shot was admissible under the 
rubric of the identity language of Rule 404(b) is not convincing 
since Ms. Leavitt made a positive in-court identification of 
Mr. Albretson. 
In Commonwealth v. Trowery, 235 A.2d 171 (Pa. Super., 
1967), the state made a similar argument to the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania. In Trowery, a witness to a bank robbery identified 
the defendant after an examination of photographs from police 
records. Over defendant's objection, his photographs were admitted 
into evidence. The Court, first noting that it is "almost too 
axiomatic to repeat the well-established common law rule 
that . . . proof which shows or tends to show that the accused is 
guilty of the commission of other crimes . . . at other times is 
incompetent and inadmissible for . . . showing the commission of the 
particular crime charged," (J^ d. ) analyzed the admission of the mug 
shot for purposes of identification in the following passage: 
The Commonwealth argues that this evidence is not 
adduced to show the commission of the particular 
crime charged, but merely for the purpose of 
identification, and therefore its admission does 
not constitute reversible error. This argument 
weakens rather than strengthens the Commonwealth's 
case, for in a real sense evidence of prior crimes 
may have probative value in proving the commission 
of the crime charged, but is excluded because the 
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prejudice stemming from its introduction far 
overshadows that value. In a case where the 
evidence is introduced merely for the purpose of 
identification, most of the probative value of the 
evidence is lost while the prejudicial effect 
remains undiminished. 
_Id. at 172-3. 
In State v. Kutzen, 620 P.2d 258 (Hawaii App. 1980), the 
court held that admission of the defendant's "mug" shots was 
reversible error and observed that "the admission of the photographs 
into evidence after [the witness] made an unequivocal in-court 
identification of the defendants was unnecessary." J[cL at 263. 
In the instant case, the analysis by the Pennsylvania and 
Hawaii courts is particularly compelling. Ms. Leavitt testified 
that she positively and immediately identified the defendant as her 
assailant from the photo spread, State's Exhibit 8. Ms. Leavitt 
further made a positive in-court identification of the defendant. 
Hence, the highly prejudicial "mug" shot evidence was cumulative and 
had no probative value in determining whether Mr. Albretson was, in 
fact, the person who committed the burglary in this case. It 
therefore was not necessary to prove identity and was inadmissible 
under Rule 404(b). 
The mug shot evidence was also inadmissible under Rule 
403. As was the case in Holder, the evidence in the present case 
was "merely cumulative" and any minimal probative value was 
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the 
implication conveyed by the mug shot that Mr. Albretson had been 
involved in prior criminal activity. 
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Furthermore, the mug shot evidence constituted bad 
character evidence which permeated the entire proceeding. The bad 
character evidence was cumulative and unnecessary for the State's 
case and introduced solely to establish guilt, in violation of due 
process. 
The jury's perception of Mr. Albretson was particularly 
important in this case where he raised an alibi defense (R. 22, 24) 
and where the State's case rested on the identification testimony of 
a single witness who viewed her assailant for only three seconds 
before becoming unconscious. The mug shots suggested to the jury 
that Mr. Albretson had been involved in criminal activity, thereby 
tainting the jury's view of Mr. Albretson and his defense. Absent 
the damaging mug shot evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood the 
jury would have reached a different decision in the instant case and 
concluded that Ms. Leavitt made an incorrect identification of the 
defendant. 
B. 
PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY THE COURT TO MINIMIZE THE 
PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF ADMITTING AND PUBLISHING 
THE DEFENDANT'S MUG SHOT WERE INEFFECTIVE. 
In recognition of the inherent prejudice of mug shot 
photos, the trial court in the present case granted defendant's 
motion in limine to exclude his mug shot from evidence (R. 51). 
However, in the immediacy of the trial setting and over defense 
counsel's objection, the Court allowed the introduction and 
publication of the defendant's mug shot with its legends masked by 
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tape (T. 67 and 72). Masking the legends of a double-shot, front 
and profile mug shot of the defendant with tape did not mask the 
nature of the photos nor their prejudicial effect from the mind of a 
juror. See Barnes v. U.S., 365 F.2d 509, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
The Colorado Supreme Court has criticized the use of 
double-shot front and profile mug shots even where they have been 
doctored to exclude information because they "necessarily import 
prior criminality to the defendant . . . " (People v. Burgarin, 507 
P.2d 879 (Colo. 1973)) . 
Illustrative of the conspicuous and distinctive 
appearance of the mug shot photo is an exchange between the trial 
judge and defense counsel as recorded in Richardson v. State, 536 
S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Defense counsel requested that 
the trial judge excise the legend on defendant's mug shot before 
admitting it into evidence. The judge refused, responding, "No, 
sir; with that (the legend) on there. There is no way that I can 
keep a mug shot from looking like a mug shot. I can cut them in two 
and trim it, but a mug shot looks like a mug shot." rd. at 222. 
The D.C. Circuit Court has emphasized the universally 
recognized characteristics of the mug shot and the accompanying 
inference of criminal activity. In Barnes v. U.S., 365 F.2d 509 
(D.C. Cir. 1966), the Court commented: "The double-shot picture, 
with front and profile shots alongside each other, is so familiar, 
from 'wanted1 posters in the post office, motion pictures and 
television, that the inference that the person involved has a 
criminal record, or has at least been in trouble with the police, is 
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natural, perhaps automatic." rd. at 510-11. 
Furthermore, in Barnes, as in the instant case, tape was 
placed over the legends on the mug shot photo before its admission 
into evidence. The Court, in a particularly relevant passage, 
pointed out that: 
The rudimentary tape cover placed over the prison 
numbers on the photograph, and over the notations 
on the reverse side, neither disguised the nature 
of the picture nor avoided the prejudice. If 
anything, by emphasizing that something was being 
hidden, the steps taken here to disguise the 
nature of the picture may well have heightened the 
importance of the picture and the prejudice in the 
minds of the jury. (Emphasis added.) 
In a memorandum decision, the New York Supreme Court 
likewise held that tape over the mug shot legend more probably 
heightened rather than lessened prejudice in the minds of the jury. 
In People v. Carroll, 402 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. 1978), the Court wrote 
that "[wjhile the prison numerals across defendant's chest were 
taped over in the photographs, this could have had the effect of 
emphasizing their nature rather than ameliorating the problem." Id, 
at 8-9. 
Further still, in a case where the triaL court deleted 
the legend on the frontal view of the mug shot (the legend on the 
profile view was left alone since it was seemingly difficult to 
read), the appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction 
notwithstanding defense counsel's consent to admission of the mug 
shots and a subsequent failure to raise a claim of error in 
admitting the mug shots in a motion for a new trial. In People v. 
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Clark, 297 N.E.2d 395 (111. App. 1973), the Court reasoned that: 
[I]n fact, an examination of the mug shots after 
the deletion could only lead the jury to speculate 
as to what information the deleted portion of the 
photograph had contained. The prejudicial effect 
of such evidence is of such magnitude as to 
overcome any relevancy or probative value that it 
may have had. (Emphasis added.) 
16. at 397. 
The case law represented above recognizes that the 
configuration of a mug shot is distinct and readily identifiable as 
such and that the procedures utilized by the trial court did not 
minimize the prejudicial effects of the mug shot. Indeed, not only 
was prejudice not minimized by the Court's actions, but prejudice 
was very likely to have been exacerbated. Placing tape over the 
legends imprinted on the profile and frontal double-shot of the 
defendant does not obviate the fact that the photo is a mug shot. 
Nor did the masking suggest that the mug shot was taken 
incident to the offense for which Mr. Albretson was before the 
Court. On the contrary, the photo itself, as well as testimony 
elicited by the prosecution, predated the mug shot as to the instant 
offense, thereby suggesting to the jury prior criminal activity by 
the defendant, thus violating Rules 403 and 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983) and Mr. Albretsonfs fundamental right to due process 
and a fair trial. 
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c. 
ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE AND PUBLICATION OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S MUG SHOT CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The admission into evidence and publication of the 
defendant's mug shot constitutes reversible error. In this case, 
where no physical evidence existed and the State's case hinged on 
the identification by a single witness who saw the perpetrator for 
less than three seconds before being knocked unconscious, the jury's 
perception of the defendant was critical. The mug shot suggested 
prior criminal conduct by Mr. Albretson, negatively impacting on the 
jury's perception of him and its determination as to his propensity 
to commit crime and the credibility of his alibi defense. 
Although Utah has not dealt directly with the instant 
issue, it has found comparable errors where the jury has been 
informed of other criminal activity by the defendant to be 
reversible. See e.g. State v. Saunders. Furthermore, courts in 
other jurisdictions have found errors similar to that in the instant 
case to be reversible. 
in State v. Kutzen, 620 P.2d 259 (Hawaii App. 1980), the 
admission into evidence of photos consisting of double-shot frontal 
and profile views of each defendant, with white paper folded and 
stapled over the lower portion of the photos, constituted reversible 
error where the State's entire case relied on the identification of 
one eyewitness. 
In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 303 (Va. App. 
1986), the admission into evidence of defendant's mug shot was found 
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to be reversible error. While the Court noted that it was not error 
to admit the photo when there exists a defense of misidentification 
and the State demonstrates a need to introduce the photo, two 
further criteria must be met as enunciated by the Court in United 
States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1973) (see also State v. 
Tate, 341 S.E.2d 380 (S.C. 1986); Sloane v. State, 437 So.2d 16 
(Miss. 1983)). Those criteria are (1) the photographs themselves 
must not imply a prior criminal record and (2) the manner of 
introduction must not draw particular attention to the source or 
implications of the photographs. In Johnson, the Court held that 
reversible error existed because the mug shot legend would alert a 
member of the jury as to the nature of the photo and its 
implications. 345 S.E.2d at 308. 
An analysis of the instant case would similarly warrant 
reversal under the Harrington test. (1) The prosecutor failed to 
establish a need for the introduction of the photo, (2) the photo of 
the defendant was unmistakably a mug shot, and (3) such information 
was reinforced by the photo itself and the testimony elicited by the 
prosecution as to its source. 
In State v. Moore, 495 P.2d 448 (Ariz. 1972), the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that the verbalization of "mug shot" when 
referring to a photograph was reversible error as an implication of 
prior criminal activity. The Moore court further approved a 
previous Arizona Court of Appeals decision which held as prejudicial 
error the admission of a mug shot where the legend was removed but 
consisted of a double-shot frontal and profile photo. State v. 
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Cumbo, 451 P.2d 333 (Ariz. App. 1969). 
In a memorandum decision in People v. Carroll, 402 
N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. 1978), admission into evidence of a mug shot with 
the legends taped over constituted reversible error. Reversible 
error also existed in People v. Clark, 297 N.E.2d 395 (111. App. 
1973), where the photo was clearly shown not to have been taken as a 
result of the charge for which defendant was being tried. And in 
Commonwealth v. Trowery, 235 A.2d 171 (Pa. Super. 1967), reversible 
error was found when a mug shot of the defendant was admitted into 
evidence for the purpose of identification. 
In the instant case, it was prejudicial error to allow 
defendant's mug shot into evidence because it suggested to the jury 
that the defendant had been involved in prior criminal conduct. 
Because there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached 
a different conclusion absent the mug shot evidence, the defendant's 
conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
POINT II 
FAILURE TO GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
STATE'S SURPRISE ALIBI REBUTTAL WITNESS VIOLATED 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-14-2 AND DENIED DEFENDANT DUE 
PROCESS. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2(1953 as amended) provides: 
77-14-2. Alibi—Notice requirements—Witness 
lists. (1) A defendant, whether or not written 
demand has been made, who intends to offer 
evidence of an alibi shall, not less than ten days 
before trial or at such time as the court may 
allow, file and serve on the prosecuting attorney 
a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim 
alibi. The notice shall contain specific 
information as to the place where the defendant 
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claims to have been at the time of the alleged 
offense and, as particularly as is known to the 
defendant or his attorney, the names and addresses 
of the witnesses by whom he proposes to establish 
alibi. The prosecuting attorney, not more than 
five days after receipt of the list provided 
herein or at such other time as the court may 
direct, shall file and serve the defendant with 
the addresses, as particularly as are known to 
him, of the witnesses the state proposes to offer 
to contradict or impeach the defendant's alibi 
evidence. 
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney 
shall be under a continuing duty to disclose the 
names and addresses of additional witnesses which 
come to the attention of either party after filing 
their alibi witness lists. 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney 
fails to comply with the requirements of this 
section, the court may exclude evidence offered to 
establish or rebut alibi. However, the defendant 
may always testify on his own behalf concerning 
alibi. 
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive 
the requirements of this section. 
The statute requires not only that the defendant give 
notice of a claim of alibi and information regarding witnesses but 
also requires the State to be under a continuing obligation to 
provide information to the defense regarding witnesses it intends to 
call in rebuttal. As a result, Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2 is a 
balanced statute which is geared toward eliminating surprise. 
The requirement of reciprocal discovery by the State 
saves the statute from a challenge similar to the one successfully 
argued in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). In Wardius, the 
United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction of an Oregon 
defendant who had been required to provide notice and discovery of 
his alibi defense without the State's having been required to give 
reciprocal notice of its rebuttal to the alibi. The Court stated: 
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. . . the State may not insist that trials be run 
as a "search for truth" so far as defense 
witnesses are concerned, while maintaining "poker 
game" secrecy for its own witnesses. It is 
fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to 
divulge the details of his own case while at the 
same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise 
concerning refutation of the very pieces of 
evidence he disclosed to the State. 
Ld. at 475-6. 
Consistent with the Wardius court, this Court stated that 
"[t]he overriding consideration in evaluating any notice-of-alibi 
claim must be the avoidance of unfair surprise or prejudice to 
either party, not an exaltation of technical formalities." State v. 
Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218, 220 (Utah 1985). 
In the instant case, the trial court's failure to enforce 
the reciprocity requirement contained in Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2 
(1953 as amended) resulted in unfair surprise or prejudice to 
Mr. Albretson and effectively denied him due process as guaranteed 
by Article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. 
Mr. Albretson filed and served on the State a Notice of 
Alibi and furnished the names of all alibi witnesses and the 
necessary information for contacting them. In addition, Ms. Davis, 
the witness whose testimony was later refuted by the State's 
surprise rebuttal witness, was known to the State before defense 
counsel was appointed. She had given a full written statement to 
the investigating officer prior to appointment of counsel (T. 101, 
124). (See Addendum D). The statement was then given to defense 
counsel in the requisite Reply to Notice of Alibi, filed on July 31, 
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1987, by the prosecution (R. 49-50). The Reply included the name of 
the investigative detective who had taken the defense alibi witness1 
statement and copy of her statement. No other alibi rebuttal 
witnesses were listed. (See Addendum C). 
In our criminal justice system, where prosecution of an 
individual is by the State, there is inherent inequality to which a 
requirement of reciprocal alibi discovery is a necessary redress. 
Recognizing that the State's resources provide an enhanced ability 
to find and present surprise alibi rebuttal, as contrasted to the 
defendant's relative lack of ability, the Supreme Court in Wardius 
stated in a lengthy footnote that any imbalance in discovery rights 
should work in a defendant's favor. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 476, fn. 9, 
In the instant case, the State had continuous 
investigative access to Ms. Davis. The State also was in possession 
of Ms. Davis' written statement within a very short time of the 
defendant's arrest. Thus, the State had weeks to learn of possible 
witnesses to rebut any aspect of Ms. Davis' statement—one such 
aspect being the route taken through the canyons. To allow the 
State to later present a surprise alibi rebuttal witness only 
exacerbates the imbalance noted by the Wardius court. 
Furthermore, circumstances suggest that the State did 
have information which would have required it to disclose the 
identity of its alibi rebuttal witness in conformity with Utah Code 
Ann. §77-14-2. 
The prosecution's method of examining Ms. Davis denotes a 
design to elicit a commitment about the route traveled in 
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anticipation of the rebuttal. The following is excerpted from the 
cross-examination of Ms. Davis by the prosecution: 
Q. So before you went to the mountains, you went 
to your mother's? 
Q. And from there where did you go? 
A. We went up to Parley's Canyon. 
Q. Tell me the route, v/ould, you, please? 
A. Went up—after I left my mother's shop, we 
went up into Parley's Canyon, up in through 
Emigration and back down out of Emigration. 
We went back to the house, had lunch. 
Q. Let me ask you this. You went up Parley's. 
That's the main freeway? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how did you get to Emigration? 
A. I took the first exit off the freeway, went 
down in that way, back up in through 
Emigration and out. 
Q. Is that the East Canyon exit? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Where you go over the mountain then you come 
back Emigration? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't come back down from Parley's and go 
up around and come through Emigration Canyon 
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through the zoo? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact, when you came back down, you passed 
the zoo. It was on your left-hand side, I 
guess. 
A. That's right. 
Q. Are you sure you went up Parley's Canyon? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you sure you made that little detour over 
Emigration Canyon? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. You're sure you came back dov/n Emigration 
Canyon? 
A. Yes. 
(T. 96-7). If the State was aware of the closure of SR65 before 
trial and simply waited to confirm the route from the witness before 
calling an undisclosed rebuttal witness, then the State purposely 
avoided the disclosure requirement and thwarted the due process 
requirements of alibi notice. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2 provides in subsection (4) that 
"[t]he court may, for good cause shown, waive the requirements of 
this section." A survey of the Utah case law dealing with 
subsection (4) demonstrates adherence to the Wardius court's 
admonishment against unfair surprise. In State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 
218, 220 (Utah 1985), the Court pointed out that n[t]he overriding 
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consideration in evaluating any notice-of-alibi claim must be the 
avoidance of unfair surprise or prejudice to either party. . . . " 
In cases where this Court has upheld the waiver of the requirements 
of the statute (or its predecessor), the opposing party has had 
actual or implied knowledge of the rebuttal witnesses or their 
testimony. See State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984); State v. Haddenham, 585 P.2d 
447 (Utah 1978); and State v. Case, 547 P.2d 221 (Utah 1976). 
In the present case, defense counsel had no actual or 
implied prior knowledge of the rebuttal witness. The surprise alibi 
rebuttal witness1 identity and nature of testimony were only 
divulged to the defense after it had closed its case (T. 115). 
Furthermore, the prosecutor offered no grounds for waiving the 
requirements of the statute (T. 15-124) and the judge made no 
finding that the State had established good cause for such waiver 
(T. 124). (See Addendum E for transcript of ruling). 
In the instant case, the presentation of a surprise alibi 
rebuttal witness greatly affected the ability of defense counsel to 
present her case, to accurately represent Ms. Davis1 testimony and 
to fairly cross-examine the surprise witness in an adequate and 
informed manner. 
In State v. Frye, 581 P.2d 528 (Or. App. 1978), the Court 
ruled that failure to give the defense notice that a police officer 
might be called to refute evidence of an alibi constituted 
reversible error since: 
Had the State complied, defendant would have 
checked the theory presented by the State's 
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rebuttal witness to see whether it was plausible. 
Defendant might have found a number of defects in 
the theory, but without the opportunity to check 
it prior to trial, defendant was left with an 
inadequate, uninformed cross-examination. The 
State was given more than ample opportunity to 
investigate and explore loopholes in defendant's 
theory. Wardius required defendant be given equal 
opportunity. 
Id. at 530. In the instant case, the surprise rebuttal witness left 
defense counsel unprepared for informed cross-examination and unable 
to investigate and explore problems with the witness1 testimony. 
Furthermore, defense counsel was unable to investigate and subpoena 
witnesses for surrebuttal. 
The State's case was based upon an eyewitness 
identification and subject to all the problems inherent in such 
cases. (See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)). The lack of 
physical evidence left the jury to decide the facts solely upon the 
credibility of the witnesses. The credibility of defendant's alibi 
witnesses was therefore of utmost importance to the jury, and in 
such a case, allowing the testimony of the surprise rebuttal witness 
was prejudicial error. 
The avoidance of unfair surprise or prejudice is the 
overriding consideration in a notice-of-alibi claim and, in the 
present case where defendant had no actual or implied knowledge of 
the State's rebuttal witness or the nature of his testimony, 
defendant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for 
a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant, DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSON, respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his conviction and renand the case 
for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of December, 1988. 
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
jOA4f C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN, : Case No. CR87-810 
: HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
Defendant 
Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2 (1953 
as amended), the defendant, DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN, by and through his 
attorney of record, DEBRA K. LOY, herein gives to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office and to the Court notice that he intends to 
claim the defense of alibi. 
The defendant intends to call the following witnesses for 
the purpose of establishing his alibi: 
1. BRENDA DAVIS, 616 East 7th South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
2. Cindy Edwards, (Address Unknown) 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £2- day-3fcpj, 1987 
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Defendant (J 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake C±ty#"^tttah -this day of 
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NOTICE" OF INTENT TO RELY 
ON THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI 
DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN, 
Defendant 
Case No. CR87-810 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2 (1953 
as amended), the defendant, DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN, by and through his 
attorney of record, DEBRA K. LOY, herein gives to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office and to the Court notice that he intends to 
claim the defense of alibi. 
The defendant intends to call the following witnesses for 
the purpose of establishing his alibi: 
1. BRENDA DAVIS, 1022 1/2 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 
2. Cindy Edwards, (Address Unknown) 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^L~[ day July, 1987. 
JjA^ A rU 
DEBRA K. LOY I 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah this K / day of 
/ 
ADDENDUM C 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ROBERT L. STOTT 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
rlLED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
ur. AUG -3^ 1987 
* ^ H Dixon Hirdlsy-CI^K 3ra O -,; Cc^r 
\ "~fV 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN, 
Defendant. 
REPLY TO NOTICE 
OF ALIBI 
Case No. CR 87-810 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through Deputy County 
Attorney, ROBERT L. STOTT, and informs the defendant, DOUGLAS R. 
ALBRETSEN, that in response to his Notice of Alibi, the State 
proposes to offer the following witness: 
1. Officer Brandt Hutchison 
Salt Lake City Police Department 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jSfJ^day of July, 1987. 
H t. STOTT <\V • ' ROBERT 
Deputy County Attorney 
REPLY TO NOTICE OF ALIBI 
Case No. CR87-810 
Page two 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this £1* day of \,*t(P(, 
, 1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply to 
Notice of Alibi to DEBRA K. LOY, Attorney for Defendant, at the 
address stated below. 
Secretary 
- 1 (k4-
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
333 South Second East 
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1 its being open or not, you would have been aware that issue 
2 might arise today. 
3 MR. STOTT: It doesn't matter whether I am aware 
A of an issue or not. The question is what was available. 
She had what I had. I donft have to go talk to a witness 
17 times or 18 times. The police talked to that witness 
and had a statement that is in verbatim what she testified 
to on the stand. No changes, no difference, no indication 
what her route was. It's not my duty to go up and check 
' every little thing and then give it to the defense, 
10 I gave the witnesses, I gave the statement, and 
IX I it wasn't until she got on the stand that I was able to ask 
the question and found out what route she took. 
MS. LOY: For the record, it was not a verbatim 
statement. The main points were all raised. 
THE COURT: Based upon what has been represented, 
the Court is going to deny the motion to have this witness 
excluded as far as the testimony is concerned, and we may 
have to see what he has got to say. Maybe there's another 
18 I route they can go around. I don't know. I don't go up that 
19 I way, 
2Q I MS. LOY: Thank you. I will need just a minute, 
[Whereupon, the following proceedings were had 





 I 124 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
